Terrorism

The terrible threats presented by terrorism have lead to a serious reconsideration of torture as a means of extracting information. While there is considerable debate regarding the legality of torture, this essay is focused on the morality of torture in the context of the fight against terror.

While most people regard torture as evil, there are reasonable moral arguments in its favor. The most common argument is a utilitarian one: the harm prevented by gathering information by torture can outweigh the moral harms inflicted by the practice of torture.

A favorite example used by torture proponents, such as Harvard's Alan Dershowitz, is the 1995 case of Abdul Hakim Murad. After being tortured for over a month by Philippine police, Murad revealed various terrorist plans, including a plot to kill the Pope. Because of cases like this, one might conclude that the evil of torture can be outweighed by its good consequences-such as preventing murder.

If the evil of using torture is outweighed by its potential good consequences, then the matter of its effectiveness needs to be resolved. If torture is not an effective means of gaining reliable information, then there will be no good consequences to outweigh the evil of engaging in torture. If this is the case, then torture cannot be justified in this manner.

While there is significant debate over the general effectiveness of torture, it appears that it is not a particularly effective means of acquiring accurate information.

First, consider the American and European witch trials. During these trials a significant number of people confessed, under brutal torture, to being witches. If torture is an effective means of acquiring truthful information, then these trials provided reasonable evidence for the existence of witches, magic, the Devil and, presumably, God. However, it seems rather odd that such metaphysical matters could be settled by the application of the rack, the iron maiden and the thumb screw. As such, the effectiveness of torture is rather questionable.

Second, extensive studies of torture show that it is largely ineffective as a means of gathering correct information. For example, the Gestapo's use of torture against the French resistance in the 1940s and the French use of torture against the Algerian resistance in the 1950s both proved largely ineffective. As another example, Diederik Lohman, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, found that the torture of suspected criminals typically yields information that is not accurate. A final, and rather famous example is that of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. Under torture, al-Libi claimed that Al Qaeda had significant links to Iraq . However, as he himself later admitted, there were no such links. Thus, the historical record seems to count against the effectiveness of torture.

Third, as history and basic human psychology show, most people will say almost anything to end terrible suffering. For example, a former prisoner from Abu Ghraib told the New York Times that, after being tortured, he confessed to being Osama Bin Laden to put and end to his mistreatment. Similar things occur in the context of domestic law enforcement in the United States : suspects subjected to threats and mistreatments have confessed to crimes they did not commit. As such, torture seems to be a rather dubious way of acquiring reliable intelligence.

Given that torture is not effective as a means of gathering reliable information, the utilitarian argument in its favor must be rejected. This is because torturing people is not likely to yield any good consequences.

Despite its ineffectiveness as a means of extracting information directly, torture does seem to be an effective means towards another end, namely that of intimidation. History has shown that authoritarian societies successfully employed torture as a means of political control and as a means of creating informers. Ironically, while actual torture rarely yields reliable information, the culture of fear created by the threat of torture often motivates people to bring information to those in power.

Given its effectiveness as a tool of coercion and intimidation, torture and the threat of torture could be used as weapons against terror. If the threat of torture is both credible and terrible enough, then the likelihood of terrorist activity could be reduced and the number of useful informants could increase significantly.

From a moral standpoint, if torture were to prove effective as a means of reducing terrorist activity then it could be argued that the use of torture is morally acceptable. The gist of the argument is that the moral harms of threatening and utilizing torture are outweighed by the moral consequences-namely a reduction in terrorist activity.

While this argument has a certain appeal, it faces three problems. First, it seems likely that adopting torture and the threat of torture as weapons would be morally harmful to the society in question. To see that this is likely, one needs to merely consider the nature of societies that have already embraced the use of torture. Second, the use of torture as a means of coercion and intimidation certainly seems to be a form of terrorism. As such, the reduction in one type of terrorism would be, ironically, offset by the increase in another. Third, terrorism is denounced as a moral evil and its alleged opponents, such as George Bush, seem to revel in claiming the moral high ground. However, a society that accepts the use of torture cannot claim the moral high ground-they are walking the same ground as the terrorists. Thus, it would seem that the use of torture is not morally acceptable.